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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Luis Vega and Paula Olmos provide a „logic of public discourse“ (p.3) that is essentially 
social. The paper undertakes a very complex endeavour to lay out the conditions 
(regulative as well as constitutive) for deliberation as plural agent argument. They do so 
by taking up the concept of deliberation in order to shed light on public argumentation, 
that is argumentation in the public and by the public. To me, the compelling point of the 
paper is the distinction it makes between individual (“monologic”) and interactional 
(“dialogic”) reasoning. By arguing against a monological perspective on argumentation in 
deliberation, they turn their attention to argument as the product or enterprise by a plural 
agent. I shall concentrate on two issues in my response: the role of deliberation in 
argumentation studies and the concept of public put to use. 
 
2. DELIBERATION 
 
The concept of deliberation, Vega and Olmos state in their opening sentences, has been 
absent from argumentation studies and has „never played a leading role. Not even today” 
(1). This finding, I have to admit, took me rather by surprise. The authors point out that 
deliberation features as one of the three genres Aristotle distinguished in his Rhetoric. 
But apart from its treatment by Aristotle, deliberation (next to the judicial genre) has been 
the pivot of the development of rhetoric in the Hellenistic and Roman tradition. And 
rhetoric was (at least at that time) the home of what one could call the beginning of 
argumentation studies. Hence, for the beginnings of rhetoric, the opposite argument to 
Vega’s and Olmos’ could be sustained: deliberation has played a leading role in 
argumentation studies. One could, however, argue, as Vega and Olmos do, that the notion 
of argument sustained in this rhetoric is that of a single speaker presenting arguments, 
hence a monologic notion. 
But also for contemporary argumentation studies the statement of the absence of 
deliberation from argumentation studies seems at least too strong. Contemporary rhetoric 
has a strong focus on public argumentation and public discourse. The studies on the 
rhetoric of social movements might feature as an example. Also, Goodnight’s suggestion 
for a “New Rhetoric” (1993) as responsible public argument employs deliberation as a 
key concept. However, Vega and Olmos are interested in a different aspect of public 
KATI HANNKEN-ILLJES 
argumentation, they aim for a “logic of public discourse”. The authors define deliberation 
as “argumentative interaction in which information, options and preferences are weighed 
and handled in order to take a practical decision or resolution, in a responsible and 
reflective way” (1). This definition seems closely linked to Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action and argumentation (1981, 1983), which is also referred to in the 
paper. Habermas’ theory is closely interwoven with his theory of the public as well as his 
theory of democracy and has deliberation at its core. Also the regulative conditions 
named on p. 6 are very much in accordance with Habermas theory of the ideal speech 
situation. However, Vega and Olmos advance this notion of argumentation by stressing 
that deliberation has at its focus not the exchange of single arguments but a dialogic 
construction of a shared argument.  
 
3.  PUBLIC OR AUDIENCE? 
 
Vega and Olmos put their interest in deliberation on a level with an interest in the “logic 
of public discourse”. The concept of public underlying this paper is central. At the same 
time, “public” is an uneasy concept. Warner (2001) names two predominant notions of 
“public”: that of the public and that of a public (p. 413). The former sense refers to a 
concept of public as a social totality – it includes all individuals in a certain (most of the 
time spatial) category like nation or state. The latter sense is close to the notion of 
audience. Once a public is addressed, this public is concrete, preformed and might also be 
in bodily co-presence, whereas the public is not an audience but a relation among 
strangers. Warner also gives an alternative, if you will third definition, describing a 
public as existing “by virtue of being addressed” (p. 413). In this sense it is discourse 
itself that organizes the public space by the attention to (p. 415) and the reflexive 
circulation of discourse (pp. 420-421). 
Vega and Olmos seem to have different kinds of public in mind when they, for 
example, name as issues for public discourse “atmospheric pollution, sustainability or the 
Third World Debt” (p. 5), which seem to relate to the sense of the public. But at the same 
time they state that this kind of public discourse involves “an interpersonal confrontation 
of the different participants” with “real bodily presence” (p.5). The latter quote suggests 
to understand public as audience, that is a public, in the sense of a specific group of 
people. The uneasiness of the concept of the public becomes especially clear when the 
authors distinguish between negotiation and deliberation: I would take it that an 
important difference between both forms lies in the notion of public. Negotiation is a 
form of interaction. Hence it is a frame that always includes specific persons (maybe as 
representatives). 
These diverse notions of “public” imply different notions of circulation of 
discourse (by different media or orally, temporally stretched or temporally compact) and 
of participation (participation by giving attention of by being bodily co-present with other 
interlocutors). They also ask for very different methodologies for empirical work. Where 
public argument in Warner’s sense or in the sense of a social totality would demand a 
focus on longer time-spans and could be understood as a process in time, argument in a 
public could be researched in short time frames and could rather be conceptualized as 
events. I would suggest that answering the question of what empirical research in this 
area could look like, would probably lead to a sharpened concept of public. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, Vega and Olmos employ the concept of deliberation, that has a long 
tradition in rhetoric, for their take on public argumentation. Their notion of 
argumentation as a shared task offers the opportunity to view arguments exchanged and 
evaluated in public as flexible, that is as not-yet-products, is quite intriguing. It would be 
beneficial to formulate the questions posed by the authors also as empirical questions. An 
empirical twist, I suggest, would sharpen the concept. 
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